There are N players and M contests, C₁,…,C M . Each player i is risk neutral and characterized by a vector g i ≡ (g i1 ,…,g iM ) where g im = 1 if player i competes in contest m and g im = 0 otherwise.
Model
There are N players and M contests, C₁,…,C M . Each player i is risk neutral and characterized by a vector g i ≡ (g i1 ,…,g iM ) where g im = 1 if player i competes in contest m and g im = 0 otherwise. Player i chooses a single effort, x i ≥ 0, to increase the probability of winning each contest in which she competes. The network structure, G, is summarized as follows:
Let p im (x i , x -i ) denote the contest-success function (CSF); that is, p im (⋅) is the probability that player i wins contest m when i chooses effort x i given that the other N-1 players choose efforts according to x -i = (x₁,⋯,x i-1 , x i+1 ,⋯, x N ). As a convention, we set p im = 0 if player i does not compete in contest m. We assume that p im depends only on the efforts allocated to contest m, and does not depend directly on the outcome of other contests. 
Tullock Contest
In this section, we extend the classical Tullock contest to our network contest environment. Let x -i ∈ R₊ N-1 denote the vector of efforts chosen by all players other than player i. If g jm x j > 0 for some player j and prize m, then the probability that player i wins prize m is given by the Tullock contest success function:
The parameter r ∈(0, 1] measures the sensitivity of the probability of success to players' effort choices. A higher value of r corresponds to a more sensitive contest success function. The expected payoff to player i is:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the contest network is symmetric. Under the Tullock CSF there exists a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. In the symmetric equilibrium, individual effort, x * , is given by: * = − 1 2 .
All-pay Auction
In this section we extend the all-pay auction to our network framework. Under this CSF, player i wins contest m with certainty if her effort choice is greater than the effort exerted by the other contestants of m.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the contest network is symmetric. Under the all-pay auction CSF there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which each player randomizes continuously on the interval [0, dV] according to the following distribution function * ( ) = ( )
The equilibrium expected payoff to each player is zero, and total equilibrium effort is MV.
Star Network
There are N contests, C₁,…,C N , and N+1 players. Each "periphery player", i∈{1,…,N}, competes in contest C i while the "star player", player N+1, competes in every contest. The winner of each contest receives a prize, V > 0.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the contest network is a star. Under the Tullock CSF there exists a unique "symmetric" equilibrium. The equilibrium effort of each player i∈{1,⋯,N} is: * = ( + 1) 2
While the effort of player N+1 is +1 * = * .
Let +1 * ( ) denote total equilibrium effort, and let r * (N) be the choice of r∈(0,1] that maximizes total effort.
Proposition 4. For all N ≥ 5 it holds that r * (N) < 1 and r * (⋅) is strictly decreasing. Moreover, lim N→∞ r * (N) = 0.
We now investigate equilibrium under the all-pay auction CSF. Suppose that player N+1 chooses effort according to CDF, F. If a periphery player i chooses effort, x, then the payoff to player i is The expected payoff of player N+1 is (N-1)V. The expected payoff of each periphery player is zero, and the expected total effort is equal to V for any equilibrium described above.
